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Comment
Collateral Estoppel in Pennsylvania*
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment reviews and evaluates the difficult subject of collateral
estoppel in Pennsylvania. Its purpose is not to attempt to answer all
questions arising in this intricate area of the law. The article seeks only
to catalogue important Pennsylvania cases, comparing them to the trend
in other jurisdictions, while pointing out apparent inconsistencies.'
Much of the difficulty in understanding when a prior adjudication
may act as a bar to a later case, and whether that bar be partial or total,
lies in the use and misuse of certain termninolog. The discussion begins
with an attempt to untangle the semanitcs involved, with an eye toward
correct and precise usage throughout the article.
II. RES JUDICATA
A. Definitions
The term "res judicata" has two distinct and separate meanings. Res
judicata, used in the general sense, embodies the entire area of the effect
of a prior judgment on subsequent litigation. Implicit with the general
definition are the fundamental concepts that give rise to such effects:
(1) that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by that result;2
and (2) that a litigant shall have only one day in court against another on
the same cause of action.8
Res judicata is often used in a more concrete and precise context. It
tells exactly when a former adjudication may act as an impediment to
litigation of the present suit. Res judicata, in the precise sense, joined
* The authors express their gratitude to Professor Aaron Twerski of the Duquesne
Law School for his suggestions in the preparation of this comment.
1. The format of this comment is borrowed from Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in
New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1965). Rosenberg organized and discussed with un-
paralleled clarity a complex area of the law. Any attempt to improve on his approach
would be senseless.
2. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
3. Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290 Pa. 331, 339, 138 A. 849, 851 (1927).
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with collateral estoppel, produce what is loosely called "res judicata
effect."
Much confusion arises due to the interchanging of the words and
their definitions. Most harmful has been the careless use of res judicata
and collateral estoppel as synonyms. Part of the problem can be blamed
on the ambiguity of the words res judicata; the term "collateral estop-
pel" did not come on the scene until the publication of the first draft of
the Restatement of Judgments. 4
Within the confines of this article, res judicata, when used, will
connote only its precise meaning, i.e., those times when a prior adjudi-
cation acts as a total bar in a present suit. It will not embrace the aspect
of collateral estoppel, i.e., the doctrine concerned with the effect of a
final judgment on subsequent litigation of a different cause of action
involving some of the same issues determined in the inital action.5
B. Requisites for Res Judicata
For res judicata to be invoked in Pennsylvania, certain identities must
be present in both the initial and subsequent suits. There must be (1) an
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3)
identity of person and parties to the action; and, (4) identity of the
quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made.6
Except for the identity of causes of action, there is little difficulty with
any of the above principles. The cause of action concept ranks as one of
the most difficult in the law to comprehend,7 and its importance is
paramount because a former judgment will not act as a total bar in a
subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action."
In Pennsylvania, causes of action are identical if the facts essential to
maintenance in the first adjudication are the same as in the second.9
Although the definition seems simple enough, the real difficulty lies in
its application. To the practitioner, the test itself offers no substantial
guidance and the pitfall lies in placing any real reliance on it. Many
inconsistent findings arise because the factors that determine whether
4. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82, 84 n.4 (3d Cir.
1941).
5. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 840 (1952).
6. American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Dickson, 345 Pa. 328, 28 A.2d 316 (1942); Siegfried
v. Boyd, 237 Pa. 55, 85 A. 72 (1912); Nevling v. Commercial Credit Co., 156 Pa. Super. 31,
39 A.2d 266 (1944).
7. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 167.
8. Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. 315, 323, 18 A. 397, 399 (1889).
9. Nernst Lamp Co. v. Hill, 243 Pa. 448, 451, 90 A. 137, 138 (1914).
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two causes of action are the same, "defy prescription." 10 "They [influenc-
ing factors] include such complex considerations as the practical needs of
administering justice conveniently and efficiently and the degree of
favor or disfavor with which the law regards the type of claim made by
the plaintiff."' Besides the required presence of the four identities, one
other crucial factor must be present before an earlier adjudication casts
the res judicata effect on the second proceeding. No action becomes res
judicata until it is settled by a final judgment.12 Again a problem arises,
as to what is a "final judgment." In Pennsylvania, the interpretation
given this phrase is liberal, and the decisions of the Public Service Com-
mission, though not a court of record, have been given res judicata
effect.13 Judgments of justices of the peace, unappealed, are res judicata
as to matters within their jurisdiction, 4 while the same credence has
been given to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public officers, per-
forming within their province. 15 It must also be remembered that al-
though a verdict has been rendered, res judicata effect is not applied
until the final judgment is made, unless there is some type of acquies-
cence.
16
C. Effect of Res Judicata
When a case has gone to judgment on the merits, and the cause of
action arises in later litigation between the same parties or their pri-
vities, res judicata precludes attack upon any issue that was raised in
the former suit, or that might have been raised. 17 However, res judicata
does not extend to an incidental finding that might have arisen during
the prior trial, which was not essential to the ultimate decision. 8
In McGunnegle v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R., 1 the doctrine that
parties to a former trial are precluded from raising an issue that was or
could have been raised there, if the causes of action are identical, was
10. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 169.
11. See, e.g., Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1959); White v. Adler, 289
N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942).
12. Dougherty v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 202 Pa. 635, 638, 52 A. 18 (1902).
13. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. v. McKees Rocks Borough, 287 Pa. 311, 317, 135 A.
277, 229 (1926).
14. Gilboy v. Duryea Borough, 228 Pa. 252, 258-59, 77 A. 461, 463 (1910).
15. Dennison v. Payne, 293 F. 333, 341 (2d Cir. 1923).
16. Kannel v. Kennedy, 94 F.2d 487, 488 (3d Cir. 1937); Ludwig v. Greene, 88 Pa.
Super. 137, 139 (1926).
17. Nernst Lamp Co. v. Hill, 243 Pa. 448, 451, 90 A. 137, 138 (1914).
18. Thai v. Krawitz, 365 Pa. 110, 113, 73 A.2d 376, 377-78 (1950); In re Lewis & Nelson's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 153, 165 (1870).
19. 269 Pa. 404, 112 A. 553 (1921).
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applied to the situation where the court failed to recognize all cognizable
issues, and the injured party failed to appeal. The railroad was refused
leave at a condemnation proceeding to withdraw a portion of land which
was described in the bond. However, the judge later charged the jury not
to consider the land sought to be withdrawn when deliberating on the
question of damages.2 0 There was no appeal.
In a later action by the landowner against the railroad for trespass on
the land sought to have been withdrawn, i.e., the same land that the
judge told the jury not to consider when determining damages, the
court dismissed the plaintiff's action on the basis of res judicata. 21 Mc-
Gunnegle was precluded from raising this issue in a second trial, be-
cause the issue was dealt with, however inadequately, in the first action.
An objection to the treatment by the trial judge of this issue, was some-
thing that could have been raised in the first adjudication. After con-
clusion of the prior trial, his only possible avenue to correct the judge's
mistake was to appeal. Res judicata prevented another litigation.
Res judicata in the hands of a skilled practitioner presents no prob-
lem. But the attorney who carelessly throws together a lawsuit can later
be overwhelmed by its effect. The key to favorable results is research,
especially if the difficulty lies in the area of like causes of action.
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: PREREQUISITES
In the development and application of collateral estoppel, Pennsyl-
vania courts have adhered to the general rule set forth in the Restate-
ment of Judgments.2 2 From this rule the courts have directly noted
several basic requirements. Where the second action between the same
parties (see discussion on parties below) is upon a different claim or
demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel in the
second action only as to those matters in issue that (1) are identical;
(2) were actually litigated; (3) were essential to the judgment (or decree,
as the case may be); and, (4) were "material" to the adjudication. A
20. Id. at 408, 112 A. at 554.
21. Id. at 410, 112 A. at 554.
22. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942): "Where a question of fact essential to
the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the
determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause
of action .... " See Thal v. Krawitz, 365 Pa. 110, 112, 73 A.2d 376, 377 (1950); Pilgrim
Food Products Co. v. Filler Products, Inc., 393 Pa. 418, 421-22, 143 A.2d 47, 49 (1958).




discussion of the application of these requirements by the Pennsylvania
courts follows.
A. Identity of Issues
Clearly the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply unless the
issue in the second proceeding is identical with that in the first. When
the cause of action in the second suit is different from that in the first,
collateral estoppel, not res judicata (complete bar) must be applied. But
when the issue of the second suit is also different, collateral estoppel is
not applied; there is no reason to preclude the issue from then being
litigated.23
In Larsen v. Larsen2 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
that the plaintiff's (Mr. Larsen) prior action for divorce based upon
indignities to the person did not necessarily bar the successful prosecu-
tion of his second suit brought on the grounds of desertion.2 5 As long as
the issue of desertion was not litigated in the prior action, there was no
reason not to allow it to be litigated subsequently. The issue whether
there were indignities to the person (Mr. Larsen) is not identical to the
issue whether Mrs. Larsen deserted Mr. Larsen.26
A case often cited in Pennsylvania in which the issues were de-
termined to be identical is Pilgrim Food Products Company v. Filler
Products.27 Pilgrim sued Filler in trespass to recover damages for the
alleged fraud of Filler in claiming that it had the authority to license
the use of a machine it delivered to Pilgrim.2 s In an earlier assumpsit
action Filler had sued Pilgrim to recover the balance due under the
contract for the use of the machine. Pilgrim's defense in this earlier suit
was based in part on its belief that Filler did not have any legal right to
license the machine. Filler received a directed verdict which was affirmed
on appeal.29 The court in the subsequent (trespass) proceeding de-
termined that the issue of whether Filler had the authority to license the
23. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 172.
24. 392 Pa. 709, 141 A.2d 353 (1958). Normally, the plaintiff would be prevented by resjudicata from bringing this suit on the same cause of action-divorce. However, this
principle does not apply to an action for divorce which is a proceeding in rem to affect
a status.
25. Id. at 611, 141 A.2d at 354.
26. This case will be discussed more fully with regard to requirement (c): the matter
must be essential to the judgment.
27. 393 Pa. 418, 143 A.2d 47 (1958).
28. Id. at 419, 143 A.2d at 48.
29. Filler Products, Inc. v. Corriere (Appeal of Pilgrim Food Products Company, Inc.),
381 Pa. 394, 113 A.2d 219 (1955).
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machine had been litigated in the prior SUit.3 0 It was identical to and
determinative of the issue of fraud now before the court.
The language and principles set forth in the Pilgrim case have been
consistently adhered to by the Pennsylvania courts without any apparent
difficulty.31
B. Issues Actually Litigated-Default and Consent Judgments
During a trial conflicting evidence is offered on an issue by both sides.
The evidence must be illicited to establish or disprove either the plain-
tiff's case or that set up by the defendant. Where a question of fact is
put in issue and is submitted for determination, and it is determined,
the question of fact is "actually litigated," and the judgment is con-
clusive between the parties in a subsequent proceeding on a different
cause of action.32
Frequently there is doubt as to whether a point or question was placed
in issue, submitted to the court, and determined. Courts have reacted
inconsistently with regard to judgments entered in default and consent
judgments. It would appear that a default judgment (i.e., defendant
fails to submit an answer) should have no effect on subsequent litigation
involving a different cause of action since no issues are actually litigated.
Similarly, where no issues are litigated in an initial action which ends in
a consent judgment, the judgment should be given no collateral estoppel
effect. Pennsylvania cases hold to the contrary.
1. Default Judgments
The Restatement declares that a default judgment is not conclusive of
issues in different actions since no issues are litigated.33 Some courts
hold that a default judgment finally determines issues pleaded by the
complaint and necessary to the judgment.34 Pennsylvania appears to
extend the latter view.
Stradley v. Bath Portland Cement Company3" is the primary case
repeatedly referred to by the Pennsylvania courts. The case is ambiguous
with regard to the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata; it
30. 393 Pa. at 421, 143 A.2d at 49.
31. See Walker v. Ohio River Company, 428 Pa. 522, 239 A.2d 206 (1968); Ede v. Hahn,
192 Pa. Super. 534, 162 A.2d 89 (1960).
32. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment c at 296 (1942).
33. Id. comment f at 302.
34. See, e.g., Woods v. Cannaday, 158 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1946); O'Hagan v. Kracke, 253
App. Div. 632, 3 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2d Dep't 1938). Cf. Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929);
Roberts v. Strauss, 108 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
35. 228 Pa. 108, 77 A. 242 (1910).
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provides an unclear rule as to how far default judgments can be taken.
Yet it is cited by later cases for the general proposition that a default
judgment is "as valid as a judgment entered after trial on the issues" 36
In Stradley, the plaintiff alleged that he was employed by the defen-
dant for a year at a fixed salary, payable in monthly installments. He.
sued for his first month's salary (specific performance of the contarct),
setting forth the contract and its terms, and received judgment for
want of an affidavit of defense by default.37 After the defendant paid the
judgment for the first month's salary, the plaintiff, in a second suit, sued
for damages arising from a breach of the entire contract.3 The court
held that the first suit was res judicata as to the material issues common
to both actions:
[A] judgment by consent or by default raises an estoppel just in
the same way as a judgment after the court has exercised a judicial
discretion in the matter.39
In legal effect, while it stands, a judgment by default . . . is the
same as upon a verdict.40
It is at this point Stradley becomes ambiguous. The defendant pointed;
out that the first suit was on the contract for one month's salary, and the'
second for damages arising from a breach of the contract. 41 The court
recognized that the legal theory upon which the two actions were
grounded was not the same (different cause of actions), but said it
made no difference in the application of the doctrine of res judicata-
"to such material issuable facts as are common to both.' 42
This language indicates that the court wanted to give collateral es-
toppel effect to the default judgment and limit the effect to those issues
necessary to the result, and not those which might have been litigated
But then the court went on to say that the first judgment settles every-
thing involved in the right to recover, "not only matters that were
raised, but those which might have been raised." 43
36. Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa. Super. 220, 225, 251 A.2d 799, 802 (1969).
37. 228 Pa. at 110, 77 A. at 242.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 113, 77 A. at 243, citing South American and Mexican Co. v. Bank of Eng-
land, 1 Chan. 37, 44 (L.R. 1895).
40. Id. at 114, 77 A. at 244, citing Orr v. Mercer County Mutual Fire Insurance Com'-'
pany, 114 Pa. 387, 392, 6 A. 697, 699 (1886).
41. Id. at 118, 77 A. at 245.
42. Id.
43. Id. Note the use of the word "raised" as opposed to the word "litigated." Perhaps
this suggests the court's adoption of an exception (with regard to default judgments):to
the requirement that a matter to be precluded must be "actually litigated."
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A later Pennsylvania case expressed that so long as a judgment is not
reversed or appealed it may not be questioned in any other case; "and
the circumstance that there was no legal contest in reaching the judg-
ment does not impair its effect. '44 The effect was evidently a determi-
nation of the issues pleaded by the complaint and necessary to the
judgment, including matters that might have been raised and decided.45
This view was echoed in a 1919 case, Exler v. Wickes Brothers.46
The court, citing Stradley, affirmed the proposition that a judgment by
default is as conclusive as one entered on a verdict. The court continued,
"a suit [referring to the default action] determines not only what was,
but what might have been litigated therein. 4 7
By giving such sweeping preclusive effect to default judgments, Penn-
sylvania has realistically ignored the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The
result is that all matters in a default action have been held binding in
any subsequent litigation involving those same facts, even though the
facts were never fully litigated. It is easy to see why such application has
been condemned by commentators. 48
2. Consent Judgments
Where a plaintiff and defendant settle a dispute and a court enters a
judgment upon the parties' consent, the cases are in conflict. 49 The
question is whether this consent judgment binds the parties upon facts
which were in issue in the action which was settled. Some courts reason
that a consent judgment implies no determination by the court of any
issues in the case.50 Another line of cases treat the consent judgment as
implying a determination of the issues in the same way as would a judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict. 5' It does not appear that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has been confronted with the typical case where
two parties were given a consent judgment and one of them, in a dif-
44. Devlin v Piechoski, 374 Pa. 639, 99 A.2d 346 (1953).
45. , In Stradley the court assumed that the default judgment was properly entered, and
all material issuable facts stated (averred) or implied in the declaration were well pleaded.
46. 263 Pa. 150, 106 A. 233 (1919).
47. Id. at 154, 106 A. at 234, citing Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165, 60 A.
556 (1905).
48. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 1; 5 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN, AND A. MILLER, NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACriCE § 5011.30, at 50-109 (1969); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, supra
note 5, at 840.
49. James, Consent Judgments As Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1959).
50. Cf. United States v. International Bld'g. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Fruehauf Trailer
Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1948); Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700 (D.C. Mun.
App. Ct. 1954).
51. See Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930); Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17,
80 A.2d 196 (1951).
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ferent cause of action, tries to raise the consent judgment to collaterally
estop litigation of the issues involved in the consent action.52
There are a few Pennsylvania cases that speak of the effect of a con-
sent judgment in a subsequent trial. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in Moore v. Deal,53 made an effort to state and
apply Pennsylvania law. In Moore, the parties had previously stipulated
to the entry of a judgment in favor of Deal against Moore arising out of
an automobile collision.5 4 When Moore then brought an action against
Deal, although the question of liability had not been actually litigated,
the court granted Deal a summary judgment.55 The district court cited
two Pennsylvania cases, Zampetti v. Cavanaugh56 and Baran v. Baran5 7
for the proposition that judgments rendered by the consent of the par-
ties are valid, final, and conclusive between the parties in a subsequent
action on a different claim as to issues actually determined, although
not actually litigated in the prior action.5
The language used by the Pennsylvania courts in the two cited cases
appears to give complete res judicata effect to consent judgments. In
Zampetti, the court noted that when a consent decree is issued there is
no legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy. 59 The
court then declared that the consent decree bound the parties "with
the same force and effect as if a final decree has been rendered after a
full hearing upon the merits,"60 and followed with the statement: "The
fact that without the consent of the parties the court might not have
rendered the judgment does not affect its effect as res judicata."0 ' Zam-
petti recognized that no matters were legally determined, but still gave
a res judicata effect to the consent decree. Evidently Pennsylvania waives
the requirement that a matter be actually litigated to invoke collateral
estoppel in an action ending in a consent judgment.
In neither Zampetti nor Baran did the courts speak of issues actually
52. In Stradley v. Bath Portland Cement Co., 228 Pa. 108, 77 A. 242 (1910), although a
default judgment case, the court, noting the similarity between English and United States
decisions, cited language in In South American and Mexican Company v. Bank of Eng-
land, 1 Chan. 37, 44 (L.R. 1895): "[A] judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to
litigation between the parties just as much as is the judgment which results from the de-
cision of the court after the matter has been fought out to the end."
53. 240 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
54. Id. at 1005.
55. Id. at 1007.
56. 406 Pa. 259, 176 A.2d 906 (1962).
57. 166 Pa. Super. 532, 72 A.2d 623 (1950).
58. 240 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
59. 406 Pa. at 265, 176 A.2d at 909.
60. Id. citing Baran v. Baran, 166 Pa. Super. 532, 537, 72 A.2d 623, 625 (1950).
61. 406 Pa. 259, 265, 176 A.2d 906, 909 (1962), Annot. 2 A.L.R. 2d 514, 528 (1948).
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litigated for the purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata. 62 The
courts were concerned with establishing the binding effect of a consent
decree or judgment. Yet the Pennsylvania district court in Moore in-
terpreted the two cases, together with the general principle of the effect
of final judgments in subsequent actions on a different claim, and con-
cluded that issues actually determined in a prior action, be it a consent
action or not, are concluded. 63 If Moore is followed, the effect will be
to preclude facts that may lie hidden in the background of consent judg-
ments. And, as in the facts of Moore, when parties consent, although
there is no finding or concession that either party is negligent or free
from negligence, they will be concluded on such issues as are deter-
mined by the consent judgment. When the parties to a consent judg-
ment have not agreed to be bound in. such a manner, the rules of
collateral estoppel do not require that they should be. The Pennsylvania
courts should take immediate steps to remedy this inconsistency.
C. Essential to the Former Determination
To give collateral estoppel effect to a matter in issue in a second suit,
not only must the matter be identical to one raised in the former pro-
ceeding and actually litigated in it, but the matter must be essential to
the judgment or necessarily included in it.6r A common example of this
requirement is seen by a situation involving contributory negligence.
Suppose a judgment is rendered for a defendant on the basis of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Assume also, that the defendant is
found negligent by the trial court, sitting without a jury. Subsequently,
if the defendant brings an action against the plaintiff, he is not pre-
cluded by the finding in the prior action that he was negligent; the
judgment in that action turned on the finding that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. The finding that the defendant was also
negligent in the first action was unnecessary to the decision. 65
In Pennsylvania, the problem is illustrated by the Larsen6 case. The
defendant, Mrs. Larsen, claimed that the judgment rendered against
her husband in the earlier action for divorce on the ground of indig-
62. See generally United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953),
where the Court declared that a consent judgment may involve a determination of ques-
tions of fact and law by the court. But, unless such a showing is made, the judgment is
not effective for collateral estoppel purposes.
63. 240 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
64. See Girsh v. Girsh, 218 F. Supp. 888, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Haefele v. Davis, 399 Pa.
504, 509, 160 A.2d 711, 713 (1960).
65. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment o, illustration 10 at 310 (1942).
66. Larsen v. Larsen, 392 Pa. 609, 141 A.2d 353 (1958). See note 24, supra.
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nities created a collateral estoppel with regard to the act of desertion
relied upon in the second proceeding.6 7 Recognizing that the issues of
fact which were actually litigated in the former action must also be
essential to the judgment to be precluded from relitigation, the court
rejected the defendant's contention. The court believed that the cir-
cumstances of the issue of desertion were but one link in the necessary
chain of proof in the prior indignities suit. The jury in the first action
could have believed the narration about the desertion and still felt
there was not sufficient evidence to find indignities, and the dismissal
of the first action would be proper.68 The matter of desertion was not
essential to the first judgment.
D. Material to the Adjudication
The Restatement declares that collateral estoppel is applicable only
where the fcsIeemm lti 1 bc U not to the tlxxauwritit .L dL Lb ULtLI I IIIICLL are in1 issue, UUiLoL L itU.illid
of evidentiary facts.69 Applying collateral estoppel to all matters,
whether subsidiary or not, would greatly increase the possibility that
an issue was wrongly determined.
Courts have expressed this principle using various terms but requir-
ing basically the same elements.70 Even the Pennsylvania courts have
used different language to express this requirement that issues of fact
must be material to the judgment to be concluded. A recent case phrased
the issue by asking whether collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation
of "material issues of fact."7 ' Another Pennsylvania case phrased the
requirement that "a judgment concludes, not only the technical fact in
issue, but also every component fact necessarily involved in its deter-
mination." 72
Courts tend to get hung up over the meaning of material or fact in
issue.73 Pennsylvania declares that before collateral estoppel effect can
be given to a judgment in another suit:
67. Id. at 612, 141 A.2d at 355.
68. Id. at 613, 141 A.2d at 355.
69. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, § 68, comment p, at 312 (1942).
70. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 182, explains that New York cases call for an "ulti-
mate" or "material" showing. Other courts have held that only "ultimate facts" as op-
posed to "mediate" or "evidentiary" facts are proved conclusively. E.g., Paulos v. Janetakos,
46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636 (1942). See also Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1243 (1943).
71. Walker v. Ohio River Company, 428 Pa. 552, 553, 239 A.2d 206, 208 (1968).
72. Rauwolf v. Glass, 184 Pa. 237, 240, 39 A. 79, 80 (1898). See also Schwan v. Kelly, 173
Pa. 65, 33 A. 1107 (1896), which held that any matter in issue which went to establish or
disprove either the plaintiff's case or that set up by the defendant will be prceluded from
litigation.
73. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 183, discussing Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d
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[I]t should appear either from the record, or aliunde [from else-
where], that it must have rested on the precise question which it is
sought again to agitate. Whether this is so or not may appear from
the record itself, or it may be shown by evidence not inconsistent
with the record.7 4
One of the tests Pennsylvania applies is whether the controverted matter
appeared in the pleadings.7 5
The purpose of limiting collateral estoppel to material matters is to
reduce the risk that the issues were wrongly determined.7 6 Perhaps the
best approach suggested to determine whether a matter is material in a
lawsuit is:
[W]hen it is clear from the record, pleadings or opinion that the
determination of the fact in question was a necessary step in arriv-
ing at the final judgment, provided that at the time it was foresee-
able that the fact might be of importance in future litigation.77
IV. PERSONS AFFECTED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:
PARTIES, PRIVITIES AND OTHERS
A. Original Parties and Their Privities
It is fundamental that the same parties and their privities are bound
by a prior adjudication, if the elements of collateral estoppel are satis-
fied. The real problem arises in determining when two parties are in
privity.
The definition of privity, given in Central Pennsylvania Lumber
Company v. Carter,7 8 was mutual or successive relationship to the right
of property, title or estate. A more modern, general approach, states
that privity involves a person so identified in interest with another that
he represents the same legal right.79
An illustration will indicate the difficulty in applying this general
definition to certain factual situations. A subsidiary of a parent company
has been held to be sufficiently identified in interest with the parent
company to the extent that it represented the same legal rights, and
927, 928 (2d Cir)., cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844); People
ex rel. McCanliss v. McCanliss, 255 N.Y. 456, 459-60, 175 N.E. 129, 130 (1931).
74. Haefele v. Davis, 399 Pa. 504, 508, 160 A.2d 711, 713 (1960), citing Head v. Meloney,
111 Pa. 99, 2 A. 195 (1886) which quotes Tams v. Lewis, 42 Pa. 402, 410 (1862).
75. Machen v. Budd Wheel Co. 294 Pa. 69, 84, 143 A. 482, 487 (1928).
76. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 182.
77. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, supra note 5, at 843.
78. 348 Pa. 429, 35 A.2d 282 (1944).
79. See generally 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments §§ 532-34 (1967).
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therefore was bound by a judgment against the parent company. This
was decided even though the subsidiary was not a party to the particular
proceeding.80 A president of a corporation, holder with his wife of 45%
of its stock, however, was not so "identified in interest" with the cor-
poration to be bound by a judgment against it for property damage.8'
The damage was to a vehicle driven by the president which collided
with another automobile. The president, although he held managerial
power and instructed the attorney to file an action on behalf of the
corporation, was held not to be in privity with the corporation so as to
make an adverse decision against the corporation a final judgment
against him in his subsequent action against the same defendant for
personal injuries sustained in the collision. 2
Once again, only research of the cases, coupled with the rough outline
provided by the definition, can assure any answers in this area.
B. Strangers to the Former Judgment
As troublesome as the concept of privity might be in certain situa-
tions, it is overshadowed by the difficulties arising when collateral es-
toppel is used by a stranger to the prior adjudication. The difficulties
result not only from the complex legal principles involved, but also
from the trend liberalizing the use of collateral estoppel as an effective
tool by a stranger to the judgment. So encompassing has this trend been
that many states have dismissed as unnecessary the former requirements
imposed on strangers.8 3
Throughout the development of collateral estoppel and the present
re-evaluation of the concepts involved, one principle, based on consti-
tutional due process requirements, has remained constant. A person
who was not a party or in privity with a party in the former action can-
not be bound by a disadvantageous decision, because he has not had his
day in court. A simple example clearly illustrates this concept. If A and
B are passengers in a car driven by C which collides with one operated
by D, a verdict exonerating D in an action instituted by A will not bind
"B" in an action against D. "B" has not had his day in court.84
The fervent adherence to this principle can be highlighted by ex-
80. Van Brode Milling Co. v. Kellog, 113 F. Supp. 845, 847 (D.C. Del. 1953).
81. Wolf v. Paving Supply & Equipment Co., 154 A.2d 544 (1959).
82. Id. at 546.
83. See B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967).
84. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93, comment d, illustration 15 at 466 (1942).
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amination of Makariw v. Rinard,85 a federal district court case, applying
Pennsylvania law. Rinard, the defendant, brought his recently pur-
chased automobile back to YBH Sales & Service, Inc. He was requested
to accompany Makariw, the plaintiff's decedent and a mechanic at YBH,
on a road test. While Rinard was in the driver's seat, and Makariw along-
side, the car struck a pothole, skidded into another car and then an
embankment. Makariw was killed, and Rinard seriously injured. Rinard
sued YBH contending that their employee, Makariw, was negligent, and
that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Rinard
recovered. As defendant in an action instituted by Makariw, Rinard
sought the use of collateral estoppel as to the questions of his and
Makariw's negligence. Although Rinard's recovery against YBH was
based on Makariw's conduct, the court held that the relation of em-
ployer and employee does not confer upon the employer any power to
represent or bind the employee.8 6 Therefore the present plaintiff was
not a party to the former action. He was entitled to his own day in
court where he could assert his claims, and present his own defenses.8 7
The consequence of this maxim "everyone should have his day in
court" is the prohibition of the use of collateral estoppel against a
stranger to a former judgment. This put a defendant faced with multi-
ple suits out of the same accident in a disadvantageous position. He
can not use an advantageous decision determined in Case I against a
second plaintiff, because plaintiff II has not had his day in court. It is
also unfair to allow reciprocal use against him of a disadvantageous
decision, if this was the outcome of the prior action. From this logic
arose the famous mutuality principle. "The general rule has always
been that no party can take advantage of a judgment or a decree if he
would not also have been concluded by it if the same judgment or decree
had been against his interest ....88
The requirement of mutuality in the collateral estoppel area is
closely related to the requisite identity of parties, needed to invoke the
doctrine of res judicata. In both areas, only parties to the former judg-
ment or their privities may take advantage or be bound by the first
adjudication. In fact, the early pronouncements of mutuality were
lumped together with the identity of parties requirement for res judi-
85. 336 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1964).
86. Id. at 336.
87. Id. at 335, citing Pesce v. Brecher, 302 Mass. 211, 19 N.E.2d 36 (1939).
88. Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 32, 131 A.2d 622, 627 (1957), citing Walker




cata. In Pennsylvania, Chandler's Appeal"9 was one of the first cases rec-
ognizing the mutuality of estoppel rule as a corollary of the res judicata
requirement of identity of parties. For many years this doctrine was
repeated, but in Pennsylvania, even among the early decisions, the cases
seemed to recognize the harshness of such a blind application of the
requirement. There is a distinct strain of fairness and good judgment
in the application of collateral estoppel and the view was toward the
actual purpose to be attained by the proper use of these doctrines. 90
With this in mind, certain exceptions to the stringent mutuality re-
quirement began to arise.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the mere addition of
another defendant in the second suit does not necessarily defeat the
collateral estoppel effect. In Slater v. Slater9' a bill in equity seeking
cancellation of deeds presented the issue of the existence of a partnership
between the plaintiff and one defendant at the time of purchase. The
court stated that the prior decision in a suit by the plaintiff against the
defendant for a partnership accounting, which determined the issue,
was controlling against the additional defendant, joined because she
held the contested property with the other defendant as tenants by the
entireties. 92
Another exception to the rule of mutuality exists where the liability
of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one in
a prior suit, where the same plaintiff uses the same facts.93 If defendant
II's responsibility is dependent on the culpability of defendant I, who
in a prior action by the same plaintiff for the same act has been judged
not culpable, defendant II may have the benefit of that judgment as an
estoppel, even though he would no have been bound by it had it been
decided unfavorably.94 In Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Com-
pany,95 Helmig brought an action in assumpsit for breach of contract.
Rockwell prevailed. In a later action Helmig sued Rockwell and Beth-
lehem Steel Corporation in trespass alleging that they conspired to
cancel the same contract which had been at issue in the first suit. The
court held that res judicata barred the second suit against Rockwell.
89.. 100 Pa. 262 (1882)..
90' See Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp. of Pa., 289 Pa. 260, 263, 137 A. 252, 253
(1929).91. 372 Pa. 519, 94 A.2d 750 (1953).
92. Id. at 522, 94 A.2d at 752.
93. Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 32, 131 A.2d 622, 627 (1957), citing Bige-
low v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
94. Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290 Pa. 331, 341, 138 A.849, 852 (1927).
95. 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957).
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The court also found that the decision in case I exonerating Rockwell
was dispositive of the case against Bethlehem. It would be anomolous
to subject Bethlehem to suit as a co-conspirator when a prior decision
conclusively decided that Rockwell did not wrongfully breach its con-
tract with Helmig.
'The third exception to Pennsylvania's mutuality requirement arises
in the criminal area. Here the court has allowed the use of a criminal
court verdict of guilty against the defendant for extortion in the plain-
tiff's civil suit to recover the money.96 For our purposes, this case shows
that a party has been allowed to take advantage of a judgment, even
though he would not have been concluded by it if the decree had been
unfavorable.
Outside of Pennsylvania, the modern trend is to discard, either par-
tially or in toto, the mutuality requirementY7 The remainder of this
article focuses on the present position of the mutuality requirement in
Pennsylvania. Since there is a scarcity of Pennsylvania cases, it will be
necessary to resort to decisions in other jurisdictions in order to present
the complete picture.
All states which have abandoned mutuality in the collateral estoppel
area, whether wholly or in part, expressly or by implication, have one
common requirement. A stranger to the judgment can invoke the doc-
trine only against one who was a party, or in privity with a party to the
former judgment, and who had a full opportunity in the prior action to
litigate the relevant issue. 9
Those states which have lessened the mutuality requirement, al-
though not abolishing it in toto, allow for the defensive use of a prior
ruling by a stranger to that judgment. In an early Delaware decision,
Coca-Cola Company v. Pepsi-Cola Company,99 the court examined the
mutuality requirement within the context of an attempted defensive
use of a prior judgment by a stranger to that earlier proceeding. In suit I
Coca-Cola charged certain stores with substitution of Pepsi-Cola for its
product. It failed in substantiating that claim. In a later action, Coca-
96. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965).
This illustrates a type of offensive use of collateral estoppel. It deals, at least partly,
with the criminal area, and therefore is not within the scope of this article. It is advanced
here merely to show one of the early exceptions to mutuality in Pennsylvania. For further
discussion of the offensive use of collateral estoppel see the text accompanying note 105.
97. See B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967).
98. Zdanok v. Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Division, 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d
Cir. 1964).
99. 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934).
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Cola attempted to collect on a reward offered by Pepsi-Cola for infor-
mation leading to the detection of any dealer who substituted Pepsi-Cola
for any other similarly priced drink. The information concerned the
same distributors they had charged in the first action. Pepsi-Cola, as
defendant, raised as a defense the adverse finding against Coca-Cola in
the initial suit against the distributors. Recognizing that certain fun-
damental issues were identical in the two suits,'0° and that there was no
privity between the defendants in the separate actions,10 1 the court was
squarely faced with the mutuality requirement. After distinguishing the
situation in which due process requires all to have their day in court,'10 2
a factual situation not present here, the court used a public policy
argument to eliminate the mutuality requirement in this particular
case:
The doctrine of res judicata [collateral estoppel] is primarily one
of public policy and only secondarily of private benefit to individ-
ual litigants. It draws its strength not so much from the private
advantage of the party seeking to invoke it, but its roots lie in the
principle that public policy and welfare require a definite end to
litigation when each of the parties has had a full, free and un-
trammelled opportunity of presenting all of the facts pertinent to
the controversy. 103
Coca-Cola was held to be bound by the adverse decision in the prior
suit, even though a favorable finding could never have been used against
Pepsi-Cola.
In some jurisdictions, the requirement of mutuality has been abol-
ished completely. These states allow, not only the defensive use of a
prior judgment by a stranger, but also the offensive use, i.e., when a
stranger to case I uses a determination from the judgment of case I
against a party to that judgment in case II. Implicit within this offensive
use is the concept that mutuality is a "dead letter."'10 4
The leading case allowing the offensive use of the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel without requiring mutuality is B. R. DeWitt, Incorporated
v. Hall.10 5 The court held that a judgment recovered by the driver of
a truck against the defendant for personal injuries arising from a col-
100. Id. at 127, 172 A. at 261.
101. Id. at 130, 172 A. at 263.
102. Id. at 130, 172 A. at 262.
103. Id.
104. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596,
601 (1967).
105. 19 N.Y.2d 141,225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
666
Vol. 10: 650, 1972
Comment
lision between the truck and defendant's jeep, precluded that same
defendant, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from relitigating
the issue of his negligence in a later suit instituted by the corporation
who owned the truck, for damage to that truck. 0 6 The court cited the
identity of issues, and the fact the first case was defended with full vigor as
two of the reasons for granting the collateral estoppel effect to a stranger
plaintiff.10 7
The impact of the allowance of the offensive use of collateral estoppel
by a stranger to the former judgment is devastating. The advantages
given to the plaintiff in mass tort cases, i.e., an airplane crash, can be
readily observed. Although a favorable disposition for the defendant air-
line can have no effect on a subsequent plaintiff's suit (because they did
not have their day in court), once any plaintiff establishes negligence,
the rest of the plaintiffs can "ride in on the coat tails" of that finding. 08
So great is the impact that some states allow the defensive use of col-
lateral estoppel while forbidding the potent offensive weapon.10 9
Those states which permit the offensive use of collateral estoppel are
aware of the harshness of such a rule on the same defendant in both
suits. Where the mutuality requirement was once instituted to assure
fairness, now the courts who have abolished the stringent requirement,
have developed various standards that must be present before collateral
estoppel can be invoked notwithstanding a lack of mutuality or privity.
The courts consider whether the party adversely affected by collateral
estoppel has had a fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issue,11°
and whether the first case was litigated strenuously and with vigor."'
Other questions like whether an adequate defense was precluded by
economic considerations, 1 2 and whether anomolous results will be
created by abandonment of mutuality" 3 are also relevant considerations
before the court will approve of a stranger's use of a prior judgment.
The question remains, "Where does Pennsylvania stand in this
rapidly fluctuating area?" As stated before, the cases in the collateral
estoppel and mutuality sphere in this jurisdiction are sparse. Although
106. Id. at 146, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
107. Id.
108. Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 303-04 (D. Md. 1967).
109. See Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969); Albernaz v. Fall River,
346 Mass. 336, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963).
110. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950).
111. Zdanok v. Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Division, 327 F.2d 944, 956
(2d Cir. 1964).
112. Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74, 81 (6th Cir. 1968).




Pennsylvania's initial entry into the efficacy of the mutuality require-
ment began slowly and orderly, the whole area has been thrown into
turmoil.
In a 1966 case, Posternak v. American Casualty Company,114 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court considered the defensive use of collateral es-
toppel and the mutuality requirement. The plaintiff in this assumpsit
action was the owner of a building which had been recently destroyed by
fire. Posternak claimed that he was insured by four policies of insurance,
two issued by American Insurance Company of New Jersey, and two
issued by American Casualty Company of Reading. After the two com-
panies refused his claims, he instituted action against the New Jersey
company in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, and a separate action against the Reading-based company in
the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. 115
Both companies raised similar defenses, alleging that Perrin, the com-
mon broker for both policies, was not a licensed broker at the time, and
that Perrin obtained the policies through fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. It was also alleged that the policies were issued subsequent to the
date of the fire.)16
The action against American of New Jersey in the federal court came
to trial first, with a final verdict in favor of American. The Reading
company filed a petition requesting leave to amend its answer, seeking
to invoke collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion, and
on appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed. 1 7 Considering
the question of mutuality of estoppel, the court stated that the Penn-
sylvania position is not so rigid and inflexible that it will defeat the right
to assert collateral estoppel defensively in the amendment to the plead-
ings.118 The court cited a long-recognized exception to the mutuality
rule,"19 but declined to advance any concrete decision concerning the
defensive use of collateral estoppel by a stranger, due to the unclear
record of the initial proceeding.120 Lacking in the record was the evi-
dence as to what issues were decided in favor of the defendant New
Jersey company in the earlier federal case. This was considered essential
in any determination of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
114. 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966).
115. Id. at 23, 218 A.2d at 351.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 26, 218 A.2d at 352.
118. Id. at 25, 218 A.2d at 352.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 26, 218 A.2d at 352.
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should be applied. 121 Although there is nothing conclusive in the de-
cision as far as abandonment of mutuality, it is clear that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court does not consider the mutuality requirement
sacred.
Armed with Posternak as the only relevant Pennsylvania precedent,
and this certainty of questionable value, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit tackled the problem of the offensive use of collateral es-
toppel in Pennsylvania in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Com-
pany v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company. 22 A passenger car
was loaned by the owner insured, Dutcher, to the driver Cionci. While
Cionci was driving, the car collided with a truck driven by Smith. Killed
in the crash were Cionci, Smith and Lynch, a passenger of Cionci. Har-
ris, another passenger of Cionci, was injured.
The estate of Lynch, deceased passenger, brought an action for declar-
atory judgment against Dutcher's insurer Lumbermen and the estate of
the driver Cionci, challenging Lumbermen's denial of coverage for the
liability of Cionci's estate.'2 The denial claim was based on the con-
tention that Cionci had deviated from the authorized use. The in-
jured passenger Harris, and the truck driver's (Smith) estate were joined
as plaintiffs, on motion by Lumbermen. The district court trial judge
excluded against the Lynch and Smith estates any testimony of the in-
sured, Dutcher, under the Pennsylvania Dead Man's Act, regarding the
terms on which he loaned the car to its driver, Cionci. 24 The judge did
allow such testimony concerning the surviving passenger, Harris. This
dispute between Harris and Lumbermen, on whether Cionci had de-
viated from Dutcher's authorized use of the car, was submitted to the
jury, which found in favor of Harris. The trial judge directed verdicts
in favor of the Lynch and Smith estates because with Dutcher's testi-
mony excluded, there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of
authorized use, raised under Pennsylvania law.125 On the insurer's ap-
peal, the court of appeals held, inter alia, that Dutcher was an indis-
pensable party under rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that the district court could not decide the claims.' 26 The Supreme
Court rejected this reasoning, and remanded the case.' 27
121. Id.
122. 411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969).
123. Id. at 90.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
128, 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966).
127. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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The court of appeals, on remand, rejected any attempt by Lumber-
men to contest the issue of deviation from permissive use against the
estates of Smith and Lynch, regardless of whom was right concerning
the exclusion of Dutcher's testimony against the two decedents. Lumber-
men argued that the district court judge was incorrect in excluding
Dutcher's deviation testimony against the two estates by use of the Penn-
sylvania Dead Man's Act, even though the testimony had been entered
against Harris, and Lumbermen had received an adverse decision. They
sought introduction so they might relitigate the issue so far as concerned
the estates of Smith and Lynch. Without the Dutcher testimony, there
was no evidence on deviation, and the Pennsylvania presumption of
permissive scope would insure a verdict on that issue for the decedents.
Their only hope was relitigation and a possible finding inconsistent
with that decided in the Harris action. Schematically the Lumberman
case breaks down as such:
Smith (truck driver-deceased) 1 v. Lumbermen (Dutcher's in-
Lynch (car passenger-deceased) surer)
Harris (car passenger-injured) Cionci (car driver)
Harris v. Lumbermen testimony allowed
f Harris wins
Smith and Lynch v. Lumbermen f testimony excluded
Smith and Lynch win
Lumbermen's position was based on mutuality. Since the insurer
would not have been able to assert against the two estates a favorable
judgment on the surviving passenger's claim-because the estates were
not parties nor privities to the surviving passenger's claim-the insurer
should not be bound as to the estates by an unfavorable judgment.
After citing Bruszewski v. United States,128 the first of a line of federal
cases rejecting mutuality, the court turned to the relevant Pennsylvania
cases, the applicable law in this diversity case. However, there was no
Pennsylvania decision in this area, and all the court had for guidance
was Posternak v. American Casualty Company129 and its language that
128. 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).
129. 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966).
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the mere mention of mutuality would not defeat the right to assert
collateral estoppel. 130
With this as their only guidance, the federal court abolished the
mutuality requirement, and held that Pennsylvania courts would permit
the offensive use of collateral estoppel by a stranger to the prior judg-
ment.
131
To question or criticize this decision--one that declares Pennsylvania
to be among the most liberally positioned states in this critical area-
would be useless. The court had no real precedent, and perhaps its
revolutionary decision, if followed, will spare Pennsylvania the long and
timely process of evolution which other jurisdictions had to endure in
order to rid themselves of the stringent mutuality requirement. The
real spotlight should be placed on the language that must be considered
crucial in light of continued abandonment of mutuality-"We, there-
fore, entertain no doubt that the Pennsylvania courts would recognize
collateral estoppel in a case such as this, where the actual circumstances
remove any uncertainty whether Lumbermens, against whom estoppel
is asserted, had a full and fair opportunity to try the factual issue .... 1,32
A party to a prior litigation was once overly protected from any use of
that litigation by a stranger to the prior proceeding by a fortress called
mutuality. Now, apparently, that party has been stripped of this pro-
tection with the permitted offensive use of collateral estoppel by a
stranger to the initial action. Another evolutionary process has begun.
Its concern is how to determine if the party to the initial proceeding,
against whom the estoppel is asserted, had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the factual issue. 133 This is the protection a prior litigant now
has. It is not a fortress, but its confines seem adequate. If this can be
assured, mutuality is truly a "dead letter.'
' 34
C. Persons Bound by a Former Adjudication-Co-defendants
In Kimmel v. Yankee Lines,x35 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in applying Pennsylvania law, held that a verdict against two
130. Id. at 25, 218 A.2d at 352.
131. 411 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1969).
132. Id.
133. For a discussion of the far reaching effects of collateral estoppel and the pre-
cautions that should be taken, see Talcott, Inc., v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451
(5th Cir. 1971).
134. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596, 601 (1967).
135. 224 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1955).
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joint defendants in a prior negligence suit, did not foreclose the negli-
gence issue as to the co-defendants in a later action between themselves.
Due to the lack of Pennsylvania precedent, the court relied heavily on
§ 82 of the Restatement of Judgments which says: "The rendition of a
judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the action who are
not adversaries under the pleadings, as to their rights inter se upon
matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportnuity to litigate,
between themselves.' 36 In the court's opinion, the two co-defendants in
this case were not true adversaries, and collateral estoppel could not be
a defense against a plaintiff who had been a losing co-defendant in a
former action. 3 7
The court distinguished this case from Simodejka v. Williams,138 a
suit which arose under Pennsylvania's third-party practice rule. The
third-party rule declares that where a defendant in a damage action
brings in an additional defendant, the defendant and additional de-
defendant are adverse parties .139 Combining the Kimmel and Simodejka
cases with the Restatement language, it appears that in Pennsylvania, a
co-defendant will not be bound by the findings in a prior adjudication as
to the other defendant, but that an additional defendant will be.
As tenuous as this distinction may seem, the Lumbermen decision
makes it even more precarious. If the mutuality requirement is truly
abolished in Pennsylvania, is it decisive that a party has not had his
day in court as against a particular litigant, or should the only question
be whether the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
precise issue in both cases before the collateral estoppel doctrine is
invoked? The answer to this question and others will be found in future
cases.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the case law in Pennsylvania on collateral estoppel indi-
cates that in this area the courts have maintained a consistency that is
unpredictable. The cases speak in general terms of what is required in
order to invoke the doctrine. When it appears that a situation falls
within the ambit of the doctrine, Pennsylvania has made exceptions (i.e.,
mutuality), or simply indicated by application that an element of col-
136. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942).
137. 224 F.2d 644, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1955).
138. 360 Pa. 332, 62 A.2d 17 (1948).
139. PA. R. Civ. P. 2255.
672
Vol. 10: 650, 1972
Comment
lateral estoppel is not required in order to raise the rule (i.e., default and
consent judgment).
As pointed out, Pennsylvania case law is sparse concerning certain
areas of collateral estoppel. It is possible that the courts haven't had the
opportunity to express any uniform administration of the rules. The
courts have been flexible in their limited attempts to apply collateral
estoppel. As in New York, they seem to be concerned with fairness and
justice 140 rather than uniformity or concreteness.
In Pennsylvania it is important in the next few years to develop a pre-
dictable, uniform set of rules consistent with the trend of considering
equitable principles. Implicit within these rules should be a focus on
realistic litigation factors rather than technical data. If this can be done,




140. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 195.
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